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CFIUS IN THE AGE OF CHINESE INVESTMENT 
Patrick Griffin* 
 
As China’s economy has developed, its companies, both state-owned and 
privately held, have moved to expand their operations in the United States to 
the point where many now seek to invest in—and on occasion, acquire—U.S. 
counterparts.  This trend has set off alarm bells over fears that China’s 
unique political and economic system, which gives the state extensive 
influence over all corporations regardless of their ownership structure, 
renders such transactions national security threats.  Recent hostility toward 
Chinese-led inbound investment is not a new trend; Congress has attempted 
to assert itself into the screening process undertaken by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) since its establishment.  
This Note examines both the framework the U.S. government has utilized to 
screen potential national security threats posed by foreign investment and 
how the eccentricities of China’s state-capitalist system present unique 
challenges to that framework.  It argues for an executive order to mandate 
CFIUS review for transactions in sensitive industries which touch upon 
national security issues, particularly telecommunications in an age of 
increasing cyberwarfare.  This will prepare CFIUS to handle the challenges 
posed by increasing investment in the United States by Chinese corporations 
without needlessly constructing barriers to the same where no real security 
threat exists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2013, several members of Congress expressed concern 
regarding a looming national security threat posed by China.1  The potential 
threat did not involve Beijing’s attempts to assert itself in the South China 
Sea, its refusal to rein in North Korean nuclear saber rattling, or its increased 
aggression toward U.S. treaty allies like Japan and the Philippines—it 
involved pigs. 
Shuanghui, China’s largest pork producer, had announced plans to acquire 
Smithfield, an American hog supplier, in what would be the largest 
acquisition in history by a Chinese company of an American counterpart.2  A 
number of senators—all from midwestern states with substantial farming 
industries—expressed concern that the deal would endanger U.S. food 
security, urged strict oversight of the deal, and questioned the real motivation 
behind Shuanghui’s gambit.3 
 
 1. See Hongjun Tao & Chaoping Xie, A Case Study of Shuanghui International’s 
Strategic Acquisition of Smithfield Foods, 18 INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 145, 
145–46 (2015). 
 2. See id.  The total value of the deal was $7.1 billion. See id. at 146. 
 3. See Ros Krasny & Rachelle Younglai, U.S. Lawmakers Air Concerns About 
Smithfield-Shuanghui Deal, REUTERS (June 5, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
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Congress’s attempts to sink the merger ultimately proved unsuccessful.  
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS or “the 
Committee”), the executive body charged with screening foreign investment 
deals for potential national security threats, quickly approved the deal.4  This 
outcome was unsurprising as the pork industry does not quite fit into the 
rubric for analyzing national security threats, the Secretary of Agriculture 
does not participate in CFIUS, and food security (as a general category) is 
not within the scope of threats historically examined by the Committee.5 
While President Donald Trump’s threats throughout the 2016 presidential 
campaign to challenge China on trade and currency manipulation received a 
great deal of attention,6 the challenges posed by Chinese investment and the 
reaction of the U.S. government to these challenges have largely gone 
unnoticed.  The Shuanghui-Smithfield merger occurred amid the backdrop of 
a number of controversial investment deals pertaining to China, some of 
which were derailed by CFIUS.7  Since the Shuanghui deal was approved, 
members of Congress have initiated attempts to expand the scope of the 
Committee’s review process.8  Much of this sentiment has been directed at 
Chinese corporations’ investments in the United States which, though 
potentially beneficial and on the rise in recent years, are uniformly met with 
suspicion.9  This hostile attitude toward Chinese investment has, in turn, 
soured many in China to the prospect of investing in the United States.10 
Apprehension of Chinese investment is not entirely unwarranted.  Despite 
its rapid economic transformation, China has, in many respects, retained the 
statist model it operated under prior to embarking on market reforms in the 
late 1970s.11  As a result, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to play an 
outsized role in its economy, and most nominally privately owned enterprises 
 
article/us-smithfield-shuanghui-congress-idUSBRE9540YN20130605 [https://perma.cc/B72 
G-A3ZN]. 
 4. See Joel Backaler, What the Shuanghui-Smithfield Acquisition Means for Chinese 
Overseas Investment, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
joelbackaler/2013/11/05/what-the-shuanghui-smithfield-acquisition-means-for-chinese-
overseas-investment/#1653d69276b6 [https://perma.cc/5KZJ-RRK6]. 
 5. See Amy S. Josselyn, National Security at All Costs:  Why the CFIUS Review Process 
May Have Overreached Its Purpose, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1347, 1366 (2014). 
 6. See, e.g., Andrew Browne, After China’s Hubris, It’s Trump’s Turn, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
13, 2016, 12:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/after-chinas-hubris-its-trumps-turn-
1481619602 [https://perma.cc/3K7G-RRVA]. 
 7. See Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014); STAFF OF PERMANENT 
SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REP. ON THE U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE 
(2012). 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See Ming Du, When China’s National Champions Go Global:  Nothing to Fear but 
Fear Itself?, 6 J. WORLD TRADE 1127, 1140–42 (2014).  Investment by Chinese companies 
abroad surpassed that of foreign companies in China for the first time in 2016. See China 
Spends More in the World Than the World Spends in China, BBC (Sept. 23, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-37448573 [https://perma.cc/HN5M-RVPR]. 
 10. See Du, supra note 9, at 1142. 
 11. See DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE? 98–124 (2016). 
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(POEs) also have substantial ties to the state.12  Because the investment of 
Chinese companies abroad is plausibly an extension of state policy  
rather than a function of market dynamics,13 it is unsurprising that the U.S. 
government is wary of Chinese corporations investing in certain industries 
closely linked to national security. 
This Note argues that, to take into account the potential threat posed by 
Chinese companies, CFIUS must be required to conduct in-depth reviews and 
investigations into industries that have a clear impact on national security, 
particularly telecommunications and manufacturing.  This method would 
help CFIUS guard against the risks posed by foreign investors subject to state 
capitalism and orient it toward the national security threats of the future, 
particularly cyberthreats.  Moreover, it would do so without taking an 
aggressively protectionist stance on Chinese investors generally, reducing the 
negative economic consequences of barring much-needed investment from 
entering the United States. 
Part I looks at the current legal framework CFIUS applies to screen foreign 
investment and proposed acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign 
counterparts.  It also examines the role Congress has historically played in 
attempting to expand the scope of CFIUS’s investigations.  Next, Part II 
explores the nuances of China’s state-capitalist system, including the ways in 
which the long arm of the Chinese state gives the government significant 
control over all aspects of society, how SOE reform has drastically 
changed—and sometimes failed to change—Chinese SOEs, and how state 
co-option of POEs calls into question their independence.  It also provides 
data on the growing capacity of Chinese corporations to provide much-
needed investment into the United States.  Then, Part III takes a look at 
specific cases involving Chinese corporations over the past few years.  
Finally, Part IV explores current proposals for reforming CFIUS, argues for 
an alternative, flexible way of regulating and screening Chinese investors, 
and concludes by calling for a new executive order refining CFIUS’s review 
procedure to mandate investigation of transactions in sensitive industries. 
I.  CFIUS:  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The primary vehicle through which the United States monitors proposed 
foreign investment schemes is CFIUS, an interagency committee composed 
of the heads of sixteen departments and agencies within the executive 
branch.14  The legal framework upon which the Committee was formed and 
operates is fairly convoluted; it was initially established in 1975 by President 
 
 12. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership:  State Capitalism and 
the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 668 (2015). 
 13. See id. at 705–07. 
 14. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2016).  CFIUS is currently composed 
of “the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, 
Labour and others.” Du, supra note 9, at 1138. 
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Gerald Ford’s promulgation of Executive Order 11858.15  The Commitee’s 
powers were then significantly expanded by section 5021 of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which gave the Committee the 
power to terminate a transaction pursuant to section 721 of the Defense 
Production Act.16  CFIUS’s powers were further altered by a provision of the 
National Defense Reauthorization Act of 199317 (“the Byrd Amendment”) 
and then by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 200718 
(FINSA). 
CFIUS reviews the national security implications of proposed  
investment and acquisition of U.S. companies or operations by their  
foreign counterparts.19  Its statutorily mandated timetable for preclearance of 
foreign investment deals entails an initial thirty-day review following receipt 
of notice, a forty-five day investigation period that only applies to deals that 
CFIUS determines requires further review, and an additional fifteen-day 
period after CFIUS relays its final report to the President, after which the 
President makes a decision regarding the deal.20  CFIUS review has only 
resulted in a presidential order to freeze a transaction on three occasions.21  
However, hostile press coverage stemming from CFIUS review and fear of a 
negative outcome frequently cause foreign companies to pull out of deals 
voluntarily or avoid investing in the United States altogether.22 
CFIUS has operated in “relative obscurity” over the past few decades.23  
From time to time, Congress has criticized CFIUS’s opaque review process 
and has frequently urged the Committee to take a tougher, broader stance on 
foreign investment.24  This part explores the history of CFIUS, the legal 
 
 15. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
 16. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 
102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2012)). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–65 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 4565).  The so-called “Byrd Amendment” required CFIUS review for transactions 
involving parties that are controlled by a foreign government. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565).  FINSA 
formalized the stages and length of CFIUS review and allowed for informal consultations; 
accompanying regulations allowed for closed transactions to be reopened. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 1. 
 20. See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign 
Persons, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008); see also EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 35–36 (2006). 
 21. Notably, all three occasions pertained to Chinese companies:  CATIC in 1990, Ralls 
in 2012, and Fujian Grand Chip in December 2016. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 4; Diane 
Bartz & Matthias Inverardi, Obama Bars China’s Fujian from Buying Aixtron’s U.S. Business, 
REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2016, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aixtron-m-a-fujian-
idUSKBN13R0DU?il=0 [https://perma.cc/AR24-FHS6]. 
 22. See Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China:  Dueling National Security Review 
Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization, 33 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 220–22 (2013); William Mauldin, China Investment in U.S. 
Economy Set for Record, but Political Concerns Grow, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-investment-in-u-s-economy-set-for-record-but-political-
concerns-grow-1460422802 [https://perma.cc/Q6RX-N5KL]. 
 23. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 2. 
 24. See id.  Congressional pressure has been a major driving force behind prior CFIUS 
reforms, which enhanced the Committee’s powers. See infra Part I.A. 
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framework under which it operates, and attempts by Congress to expand the 
Committee’s scope of review. 
A.  Early CFIUS 
President Ford established CFIUS through an executive order in 1975 amid 
concerns regarding growing levels of inbound investment by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose member 
states are flush with oil money.25  At the time, many in Congress feared that, 
in light of the oil embargo launched by OPEC two years earlier, the spurt of 
investment was motivated by political rather than economic considerations.26 
The executive order establishing CFIUS set forth the basic structure of the 
Committee and stipulated that it would possess the “primary continuing 
responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact 
of foreign investment in the United States . . . and for coordinating 
the implementation of United States policy on such investment.”27  The 
executive order delegated significant responsibilities to CFIUS, including (1) 
the collection of data regarding trends in foreign investment in the United 
States, (2) providing guidance with respect to coordinating with foreign 
governments regarding potential investment, (3) reviewing proposed 
transactions with implications for U.S. interests, (4) considering proposals 
for new legislation or regulations to enhance oversight of foreign investment 
as deemed necessary, and (5) coordinating the views of the executive branch 
and discharging its responsibilities pursuant to the Defense Production Act 
of 1950.28 
CFIUS was established at a time when the United States was actively 
encouraging foreign corporations to invest in the country, an initiative that 
was largely successful given the strength of the U.S. economy. 29   The 
Committee was thus fairly inactive in its infancy, only meeting ten times 
between 1975 and 1980 and seemingly at a loss as to what it should be 
investigating in screening investments that had implications for “national 
interests”—specifically, whether political or economic aspects fell within the 
scope of its review.30  This led to complaints from Congress, which urged the 
 
 25. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 1–3; see also Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 
20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
 26. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 1.  A Treasury Department memorandum from the 
time confirms that the Committee was established to placate Congress’s concerns. See id. 
 27. Exec. Order No. 11,858, § 1(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,263; see also JACKSON, supra note 
14, at 2. 
 28. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, § 1(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,263.  Notably, the Committee’s 
power to review proposed investments was essentially limitless, as it was given purview over 
any investment that, “in the judgment of the Committee, might have major implications for 
United States national interests.” Id. § 1(b)(3), 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,263. 
 29. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 33.  President Reagan’s 1983 
announcement, the first by a U.S. President, declared that “[t]he United States believes that 
foreign investors should be able to make the same kinds of investment, under the same 
conditions, as nationals of the host country.  Exceptions should be limited to areas of legitimate 
national security concern or related interests.” Id. 
 30. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 3. 
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Committee to address whether the investments were actually beneficial.31  
This tension between CFIUS taking a passive, investment-friendly approach 
to review and Congress advocating a more protectionist stance has been a 
consistent issue at every stage of the Committee’s existence.32 
B.  Exon-Florio Amendment 
and Concerns over Japan in the 1980s 
Throughout the 1980s, CFIUS mostly investigated investment deals 
involving Japanese corporations at the behest of the Department of 
Defense.33  CFIUS undertook these investigations amid growing anxiety in 
the United States regarding the rapid growth of the Japanese economy, fears 
that U.S. companies were particularly vulnerable to foreign takeover, and a 
boom in acquisition of U.S. corporations by Japanese counterparts fueled by 
a weak dollar.34 
One particularly contentious acquisition scheme was Fujitsu’s attempt to 
purchase an 80 percent share of Fairchild, a California semiconductor 
manufacturer.35  The implications of the Japanese takeover of a computer 
industry titan sparked concern both in Congress and within the business 
community.36  Opponents of the proposed acquisition argued that it would 
damage U.S. competitiveness and harm national security by giving Japan 
access to vital U.S. technology and making the United States dependent on 
Japan for semiconductor production.37  Although the Reagan administration 
worried that scrutiny of the deal would chill foreign investment and damage 
trade relations with Japan, it nonetheless submitted to Congress’s concerns 
and instructed CFIUS to conduct a review.38 
While CFIUS theoretically possessed fairly broad powers pursuant to its 
enabling executive order, it was ultimately an advisory body. 39   The 
Committee was bereft of any authority to pass regulations or take substantive 
action beyond recommending that the President invoke the International 
 
 31. See id. (“[W]hat we really want to know about foreign investments in the United 
States . . . is:  Is it good for the economy?”). 
 32. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 33–73. 
 33. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 2–3.  Jackson notes two attempts by Japanese 
corporations to acquire U.S. counterparts that manufactured metals for the U.S. military and a 
third by a French corporation that was resolved by reassigning the classified contracts to the 
U.S. parent company. See id. 
 34. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 40–41. 
 35. See David E. Sanger, Japanese Purchase of Chip Maker Canceled After Objections in 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/17/business/japanese-
purchase-of-chip-maker-canceled-after-objections-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/N67D-WM 
85]. 
 36. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 41. 
 37. See id.  Graham and Marchick note that one observer likened the sale to “selling Mount 
Vernon to the Red coats,” a puzzling comparison given Japan was (and still is) an ally of the 
United States, which we are obligated to defend. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id.  The executive order authorized CFIUS to review any deal that “might have 
major implications for United States national interests” but was not given actual power to 
ensure its recommendations were fulfilled. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 11,858 § 1(b)(3), 40 
Fed. Reg. 20,263, 20,263 (May 7, 1975)). 
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Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).40  Because invoking IEEPA 
would have been seen as an overtly hostile act against Japan, the Reagan 
administration was highly unlikely to block the merger.41  Fujitsu eventually 
abandoned the deal due to the bad press that resulted from Congress’s 
opposition to the deal rather than any action taken by CFIUS or President 
Reagan.42 
Although Congress’s scrutiny of the Fujitsu-Fairchild merger killed the 
deal, the Reagan administration’s reluctance to heed Congress’s concerns 
worried many lawmakers.43  This led to action on the part of Congress, 
spearheaded by Senator James Exon of Nebraska, who introduced a bill that 
would “grant the President discretionary authority to review and act upon 
foreign takeovers, mergers, [and] acquisitions . . . which threaten the national 
security or essential commerce of the United States.”44  The legislation’s goal 
was to “encourage the Administration to protect the national interest” and 
create a legal mechanism for the President to block acquisition of U.S. 
companies by foreign counterparts without invoking a national emergency as 
required by IEEPA. 45   Senator Exon’s bill, along with a similar bill 
introduced contemporaneously in the House of Representatives by 
Representative James Florio of New Jersey, gave the President the explicit 
power to block foreign acquisitions that he deemed harmful to U.S. national 
interests.46 
These efforts culminated in the Exon-Florio Amendment of 1988, which 
specified the process by which CFIUS now reviews foreign investment 
transactions and explicitly gave the President the power to review and block 
such transactions without being compelled to invoke a national emergency 
pursuant to IEEPA.47  The provision allows CFIUS itself to initiate review of 
a transaction or for parties of a covered transaction to submit their deal for 
review via written notice. 48   Upon conducting a review, CFIUS must 
 
 40. See id. at 41.  IEEPA, enacted in 1977, authorizes the President to regulate commerce 
upon declaration of a national emergency in response to any unusual threat from a foreign 
source. See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 
Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)). 
 41. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 41–42. 
 42. See id. at 41. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id.  Various congressmen pointed out at the time that the requirement of declaring 
a national emergency essentially constituted a declaration of hostilities against the government 
of the acquiring company, rendering the President’s veto theoretical. See id. at 41–42. 
 46. See id. at 42; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2012)). 
 47. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 102 Stat. at 1425.  While 
the President no longer had to declare a national emergency under IEEPA, his or her power 
under this provision was curtailed by the requirement that he or she “must conclude that (1) 
other U.S. laws are inadequate or inappropriate to protect the national security; and (2) he must 
have ‘credible evidence’ that the foreign investment will impair the national security.” 
JACKSON, supra note 14, at 3. 
 48. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 5021, 102 Stat. at 1425.  
“Covered transaction” is defined as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or 
pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign 
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consider the following factors, among others:  (1) the effect of the proposed 
acquisition on the United States’s production capacity in areas relevant to 
national security; (2) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. 
technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security; (3) the 
potential national-security-related effects on U.S. critical infrastructure, 
including major energy assets; (4) whether the covered transaction is a 
foreign-government-controlled transaction; (5) the state of relations between 
the company’s country and the United States, specifically with respect to 
cooperating in counterterrorism efforts; (6) the long-term projection of U.S. 
requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources; and (7) such 
other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be 
appropriate.49 
As the breadth and open-ended nature of the factors illustrate, Congress 
wanted the term “national security” to “be read in a broad and flexible 
manner” to give CFIUS leeway to consider the economic effects of  
a proposed transaction. 50   CFIUS went on to leave “national security” 
undefined in the U.S. Treasury regulation implementing Exon-Florio 
“because [doing so] could improperly curtail the President’s broad authority 
to protect the national security.”51  While this has led to CFIUS reviewing 
transactions involving industries outside of the defense industrial base, until 
recently CFUIS had only reviewed industries that were at least tangentially 
related to national security.52 
Notably missing from the Exon-Florio factors are explicit economic 
interest considerations—though not for lack of trying on Congress’s part.53  
Exon’s original bill explicitly included economic interests as a factor in 
CFIUS review, including the impact on unemployment, but these proposals 
were met with strong opposition from the Reagan administration.54  Congress 
eventually removed those provisions when it became clear the President 
would veto the bill if it moved beyond protean national security 
considerations.55  Subsequent attempts in the 1990s and 2000s to amend the 
Exon-Florio Amendment to include economic interests and to shift the chair 
of CFIUS away from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of 
Commerce also proved unsuccessful.56 
 
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4565(a)(3). 
 49. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(f). 
 50. See GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 20, at 38 (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S48333 
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1988) (statement of Sen. Exon)). 
 51. Id. (quoting Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by 
Foreign Persons, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008)). 
 52. See id. (noting such examples as “technology, telecommunications, energy and natural 
resources, manufacturing, and transportation”). 
 53. See id. at 43–44. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 46–49.  Many in Congress saw the Treasury Secretary as being lax on foreign 
investment review because the nature of the position entails a strong preference to encourage 
such investment. See id. at 49. 
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C.  The Byrd Amendment, FINSA, 
and Concerns over the Middle East Post-9/11 
One successful attempt to amend Exon-Florio was launched in 1992 by 
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia.57  The Byrd Amendment mandated 
CFIUS review for pending mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers so long as 
the acquirer is “controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government . . . or [the] takeover . . . could result in control of a person 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the 
national security of the United States.”58  The amendment seemingly forced 
CFIUS’s hand with respect to reviewing acquisitions pursued by foreign 
governments or their agents.59  However, it did not necessarily mandate that 
CFIUS reject such transactions upon conducting a review.60 
CFIUS members interpreted the amendment to grant the Committee 
discretion with respect to conducting full forty-five-day investigations into 
covered transactions, while Congress interpreted the amendment to require a 
full investigation.61  This led to tensions over the 2006 DP World acquisition, 
in which CFIUS declined to conduct a full forty-five-day investigation into 
the acquisition of a U.S. company by a U.A.E. state-owned corporation, 
Dubai Ports World.62  The Committee argued, based on an extensive review 
it conducted prior to the company formally filing the case, that the deal did 
not pose a national security threat and thus did not meet the second criterion 
of the Byrd Amendment.63 
Congress, tapping into widespread apprehension regarding the Middle 
East in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
vociferously disagreed, leading the Bush administration to make a substantial 
change to how CFIUS operated. 64   In late 2006, CFIUS approved the 
acquisition of Lucent Technologies, Inc., by a French corporation, Alcatel 
SA, but only after requiring that Alcatel sign a Special Security Arrangement, 
which (1) restricted its access to sensitive work done by Lucent pertaining to 
the United States’s communications infrastructure and (2) allowed CFIUS to 
reopen a review of the deal and overturn approval at any point.65  This was a 
significant setback for foreign investors, who could previously rest assured 
that as long as they passed CFIUS review, their deal would not face further 
opposition from the U.S. government.66 
 
 57. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 6; see also National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–65 (1992) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2012)). 
 58. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, § 837(a)(2)(b), 106 Stat. at 
2464. 
 59. The wording of the first clause—“controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government”—is vague, which could potentially cause confusion with respect to parties from 
countries operating under state capitalism, such as China. See id.; infra Part II. 
 60. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 6. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 6–7. 
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Congress, still not pleased, enacted FINSA,67 which resulted in President 
George W. Bush’s promulgation of Executive Order 13,456 on January 23, 
2008.68  FINSA formalized the current CFIUS review system, which gives 
the Committee thirty days to conduct an initial review, forty-five days to 
conduct an investigation if the review gives rise to national security concerns, 
and fifteen days for the President to make a final decision.69 
FINSA also provides for the continuation of the informal review process, 
which had gradually developed outside of the formal three-step process.70  
The informal review, usually undertaken prior to filing a transaction with 
CFIUS, allows individual firms to discuss the transaction with the Committee 
privately.71  This gives firms the opportunity to correct any glaring issues 
with covered transactions and, if such issues cannot be resolved, the 
opportunity to abandon the deal without incurring negative publicity.72 
In the decade since FINSA’s enactment, Congress has made further 
attempts to tweak CFIUS’s modus operandi.73  These have included broad 
reform of the CFIUS framework to require that the Committee consider the 
economic impact of foreign investment and takeover schemes rather than 
limit review to national security issues.74  There have also been narrower 
proposed amendments, such as Senator Chuck Grassley’s bill placing the 
Secretary of Agriculture on the Committee in a nod to concerns over food 
security.75  Most of these attempted reforms have been aimed specifically at 
covered transactions involving Chinese firms.76  Indeed, China now tops the 
list of nations of origin for foreign companies undergoing CFIUS review.77  
Many Chinese companies withdraw from deals before the Committee even 
reviews them, fearing the blowback from a high-profile rejection.78  The next 
part describes the evolution of China and its companies in the past few 
decades and why some Americans, including members of Congress, believe 
they pose a special threat to U.S. national security. 
 
 67. See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 
Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2012)). 
 68. See Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677 (Jan. 23, 2008). 
 69. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 7. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 7–8. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Mary Ellen Stanley, From China with Love:  Espionage in the Age of Foreign 
Investment, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1033, 1058–61 (2015). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Securing American Food Equity Act of 2016, S. 3161, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016). 
 76. See Stanley, supra note 73, at 1058–59.  The Shuanghui-Smithfield merger and the 
break between Congress and CFIUS that it caused was the specific trigger of attempted CFIUS 
reform. See infra Part III.C. 
 77. See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 27.  Jackson’s data show that between 2012 and 2014, 
Chinese companies were involved in 68 of the 356 covered transactions reviewed by CFIUS; 
U.K. corporations were a distant second at 45. 
 78. See Xie Yu, China Overtakes US as World’s Largest Assets Acquirer, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/ 
2025385/china-overtakes-us-worlds-largest-assets-acquirer [https://perma.cc/9YPT-9QBR].  
Yu’s article notes that national security concerns prematurely kill China-related merger and 
acquisition deals around the world, not just in the United States. See id. 
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II.  THE CHINESE CHALLENGE:  THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
POSED BY INBOUND CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since embarking on an ambitious program of reform and opening up in the 
late 1970s, China has rapidly transformed itself from an economic basket 
case to the second largest economy in the world.79  This transformation was 
achieved through loosening the state’s control over the economic activities 
of its people; however, economic reforms were not matched with a 
dismantling of SOEs or a retreat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
from its pervasive presence in every aspect of society.80  As a result, not only 
do SOEs continue to play a significant role in the Chinese economy, but the 
numerous POEs that have grown during the Reform Era have such close links 
with the government that the state/private ownership distinction is of 
questionable value.81 
The dominance of the state in China’s business sphere, blurry distinction 
between SOEs and POEs, and potential for state interests to control the 
strategic decisions of Chinese corporations operating abroad, inform U.S. 
suspicions of Chinese companies seeking to invest in or acquire their 
American counterparts.  However, China’s state-capitalist model has also 
created unprecedented economic growth, which has the potential to benefit 
the United States as Chinese corporations seek to invest abroad.  Chinese 
inbound investments could mean continued jobs for U.S. workers and an 
influx of capital for infrastructure in addition to new and innovative projects 
and enterprises. 
Part II.A discusses the CCP’s role in contemporary Chinese society, how 
its ubiquitous presence allows it to assert state interests even upon POEs, and 
the evolution of Chinese SOEs over the past few decades.  The net result is 
that, despite the onset of capitalism, Chinese companies remain state organs 
to a far greater degree than other foreign companies from capitalist 
economies, and, consequently, investments in the United States are plausibly 
acts of state, not of private actors in a market.  Part II.B examines the 
opportunities of Chinese investment by exploring its potential scale and the 
effects it could have on the U.S. economy, job markets, and infrastructure 
growth. 
A.  The Long Arm of the Communist Party 
This part discusses the control that the CCP holds over the Chinese 
government, society, and business sphere and describes how this high degree 
of control blurs the distinction between state and private ownership of 
corporations seeking to invest in the United States. 
 
 79. See GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RU4L-
URRD]. 
 80. See infra Part II.A. 
 81. See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 12, at 716–17. 
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1.  Party Membership and Party Committees in POEs 
While the CCP largely abandoned the economic aspects of communism 
upon launching the Reform Era in 1978, it has retained the Leninist political 
structure that characterizes the political system of communist nations.82  Far 
from decentralizing power and loosening the party’s grip on the state, the 
CCP has preserved its position as the paramount authority within the Chinese 
state apparatus.83 
One key aspect of the CCP’s strategy since embarking on market 
reforms—and, indeed, a key reason for its continued vitality—is its 
successful co-option of the growing business class.84  For much of its history, 
the CCP was extremely hostile to business owners, seeing them as inherent 
ideological enemies and placing them directly in the crosshairs of the class 
struggles that came to define China under Mao Zedong.85  After winning the 
civil war and solidifying its control over the country in 1949, the CCP 
immediately launched a violent purge of landlords.86  Though it initially 
attempted to develop links with entrepreneurs that were not associated with 
the Nationalist regime it replaced, this period of detente was short lived.87  
By the mid-1950s, the CCP had launched a campaign against “economic 
crimes,” which was primarily aimed at the business class. 88   For the 
remainder of the Maoist era, the state controlled almost every substantial 
aspect of economic activity, often with disastrous results, and actively 
persecuted anyone associated with private entrepreneurship.89 
This attitude changed by necessity after China began reforming its 
economy, but the party was still closed off to entrepreneurs in the initial phase 
of the Reform Era.90  The private sector was essentially restricted to street 
vendors and small-scale firms for most of the 1980s.91  New businesses were 
limited by law to individually owned enterprises (getihu), which were 
prohibited from employing eight or more workers.92  Moreover, many of 
these new businesses were run by the still-stigmatized victims of Mao-era 
 
 82. See RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY:  THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST 
RULERS, at xx–xxii (2010). 
 83. See id. at 22–30.  McGregor also highlights the subordinate relationship the judiciary 
has with the CCP, with judges instructed to “remain loyal—in order—to the Party, the state, 
the masses and, finally, the law.” Id. at 24. 
 84. See id. at 194–205. 
 85. See EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 145–47 
(2011).  Mao saw class struggle as the “key link” to communist rule, made it central to the 
Cultural Revolution, and despaired at the notion that his eventual successor would repudiate 
the cause. See id. 
 86. See id. at 37. 
 87. See Bruce J. Dickson, Integrating Wealth and Power in China:  The Communist 
Party’s Embrace of the Private Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 827, 831 (2007). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See MCGREGOR, supra note 82, at 194; see also Dickson, supra note 87, at 831. 
 90. See Dickson, supra note 87, at 827. 
 91. See id. at 831. 
 92. See id. 
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political campaigns.93  The government eased restrictions on the size of 
private firms in 1988, but this move was strongly contested by the party’s 
orthodox faction, which insisted that private ownership was incompatible 
with Chinese-style socialism.94  This faction cited the CCP’s relaxation of 
restrictions on private entrepreneurs as the primary cause of the Tiananmen 
Square uprising in 1989 and successfully pushed for a ban on their 
recruitment into the party.95 
While the role of private business within the Chinese economy and the 
CCP itself remained a contentious topic for much of the 1990s, the private 
sector boomed after Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” in 1992,96 and local 
party leaders increasingly circumvented the ban on recruiting private 
entrepreneurs.97  This led to the formal end of the ban in 2001.98  A year later, 
Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, launched the “Three Represents” slogan, 
which declared that the party now also represented the growing urban social 
elite that was rapidly expanding as a result of economic reforms.99  This 
marked the formal beginning of the CCP’s attempt to co-opt private business 
owners.100 
Membership in the party has exploded since, as many entrepreneurs see 
formal entry into the CCP as key to the success of their business given the 
party’s dominance over all aspects of Chinese society. 101   The CCP is 
currently the largest political party in the world, with an estimated seventy-
five million members.102  Moreover, the party actively recruits prominent 
businesspeople and other leading figures in society,103 who are more than 
happy to join the CCP in the hopes of receiving favorable treatment from the 
government.104  Alibaba CEO Jack Ma, basketball player Yao Ming, Baidu 
founder Robin Li, and actor Jackie Chan are all party members who 
 
 93. See id.  Dickson further notes, however, that these restrictions were often ignored in 
practice. See id. 
 94. See id. at 831–32.  The 1980s were characterized by political struggles between the 
reform and orthodox factions of the CCP, with the latter engineering the campaigns against 
spiritual pollution (1983) and bourgeois liberalization (1987) to purge proreform enemies. See 
VOGEL, supra note 85, at 563–65, 585–87. 
 95. See Dickson, supra note 87, at 832. 
 96. Deng Xiaoping, still de facto ruler of China at the time, went on a tour of developing 
businesses in the Pearl River Delta region in 1992 to show support for their continued 
development.  This move was seen as reaffirming support for private enterprises, which had 
grown prior to the Tiananmen crackdown and ended the brief period of conservative 
resurgence. See VOGEL, supra note 85, at 664–90. 
 97. See Dickson, supra note 87, at 832. 
 98. See id. at 833. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 842; see also Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 573, 587 (“Having an association with the [CCP] is helpful because in every 
important political, social, or economic sector in China, the [CCP] is either directly involved 
or is involved not too far below the surface.”). 
 102. See Chow, supra note 101, at 588. 
 103. See Dickson, supra note 87, at 837. 
 104. See Chow, supra note 101, at 587. 
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frequently attend CCP political conferences and promote the government’s 
initiatives abroad.105 
The prevalence of party members in positions of power throughout the 
private sector pose challenges for the United States in analyzing how to 
classify the companies these individuals run and the potential threats they 
pose.106  While the Chinese government is theoretically independent of the 
party, in reality, the CCP controls and operates above the government.107  
The CCP has established a number of bodies that mirror government 
institutions.108  For example, while the government convenes a National 
People’s Congress, which theoretically serves as the supreme legislative 
body of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP itself holds a 
National Party Congress and selects members of the Politburo, which, in 
reality, holds substantive lawmaking power.109  Frequently, government and 
party bodies overlap entirely, particularly with respect to military 
institutions.110 
The CCP asserts its control over private enterprises by welcoming their 
owners into its ranks; it also actively penetrates these entities through party 
committees—groups of party members who occupy high-level positions in 
the company and relay information back to the CCP.111  Party committees 
are technically just one of many committees within a corporation, most of 
which operate under the company’s board of directors. 112   In reality, 
however, the party committee exercises “decisive influence” over the 
nominal directors of the company.113  The presence of these committees in 
Chinese corporations has become a major cause of concern for the U.S. 
government.114  While party committees serve as an important link between 
the CCP and social institutions, the West sees them as unorthodox and 
inherently suspect signs of state penetration, and, thus, they are often 
downplayed to foreign audiences.115  The president of the Bank of China, Li 
 
 105. See Nathan Vanderklippe, Economic, Political Plans at Play as Ma Sells Trudeau on 
a Modern China, GLOBE & MAIL (Sept. 2, 2016, 8:47 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
news/world/eonomic-and-political-plans-will-be-at-play-during-trudeau-ma-meeting/article 
31703382/ [https://perma.cc/ZS8U-75L9]. 
 106. See infra Part III.A. 
 107. See Chow, supra note 101, at 586. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 587. 
 111. Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks:  Nomenklatura 
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS:  CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 126 (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha 
Avery eds., 2009).  Naturally, SOEs also contain party committees; Howson’s article speaks 
specifically to party committees within state-owned banks. See id.  That these committees play 
an equally prominent role in the management of privately held corporations evinces how 
meaningless ownership structure is as the key indicator of state control in China. See Milhaupt 
& Zheng, supra note 12, at 716–17. 
 112. See Howson, supra note 111, at 139. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 7, at 22–24. 
 115. See Howson, supra note 111, at 139–40.  Party committees are “widely discussed in 
Chinese writings and journalism . . . but rarely referred to in foreign language writings, 
journalism, or offshore listing offering[s].” Id. 
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Lihui, described the function of party committees within Chinese companies 
in a 2005 interview with Caijing magazine as follows: 
At present, some members of the board of directors, supervisory board and 
senior management are Party members.  The Chairman [of the board] is the 
Party Committee Secretary, and [the] head of the Supervisory Board and 
the President are Vice-Secretaries of the Party Committee.  The [Party] 
Committee is to monitor macro-policy, firm direction, Party structure, as 
well as the structure of the Party membership, and monitor coordination 
among different departments.  In China, it is very important to employ the 
political power of the Communist Party.  Management arrangements can 
solve a majority of the problems, but not all of them.  For example, if asked 
how to develop political ideology work or how to increase employees’ 
ethical standards, and so on—these issues must be studied by the Party 
Committee.116 
Li’s forthright description, particularly his emphasis on the political power 
of the party and the need to promote “ideology work,” would likely do little 
to ease the concerns of Western governments.  From their perspective, party 
committees appear to be agents of the Chinese state who hold the real reins 
of power in most corporations.117 
2.  The Evolution of Chinese SOEs in the Reform Era 
Under Chairman Mao, SOEs dominated the Chinese economy and 
constituted over 80 percent of the country’s industrial output.118  In the wake 
of the reform program launched by Deng Xiaoping, SOEs have, relatively 
speaking, declined in importance as the government has sought to consolidate 
them, while POEs have proven increasingly successful in certain 
industries.119  However, the state-owned sector is still a major part of the 
Chinese economy.  It accounted for 51 percent of China’s GDP as of 2015,120 
and SOEs themselves make up 950 of the 1,000 largest firms in China.121  
Moreover, the government has promoted SOEs in sectors of the economy 
deemed vital for policy and national security reasons, such as “banking, 
telecommunications, steel production and manufacturing, oil and gas 
exploration and refining, electricity and water supply, and train and air 
transport.”122 
During the Maoist era, SOEs were under total state control and operated 
as collective production units rather than profit-seeking corporations, with 
the government determining what and how much each SOE produced.123  
This proved to be a highly inefficient business model, and SOE reform was 
 
 116. Id. at 142–43 (emphasis added); see also MCGREGOR, supra note 82, at 34. 
 117. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 7, at 22–24. 
 118. See Chow, supra note 101, at 580. 
 119. See id. at 581 (“‘By 2004, SOEs accounted only for 15.3 percent’ of China’s industry 
output.” (quoting DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 25 (2d ed. 2009))). 
 120. See MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S CRONY CAPITALISM 20 (2016). 
 121. See Du, supra note 9, at 1152. 
 122. Chow, supra note 101, at 581. 
 123. See Du, supra note 9, at 1152. 
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a major government initiative throughout the 1980s.124  SOE reform was 
grounded in three major planks:  (1) concentrating SOEs in critical industries 
and promoting their dominance of those industries over POEs, (2) the 
establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) to coordinate and oversee SOE management, and (3) 
a reduction in the number of SOEs through consolidation. 125   SASAC 
pursued an aggressive merger policy, under which the absolute number of 
SOEs dropped, but the size of individual corporations increased 
dramatically.126  While this consolidation has theoretically made SOEs more 
efficient, in practice it has resulted in bloated, poorly managed enterprises 
which frequently require massive loans from banks.127  Moreover, SOEs are 
particularly prone to corruption and often serve as vehicles to provide jobs 
and payouts for the relatives of powerful party officials.128  Overall, however, 
SOEs have transformed into full-fledged for-profit enterprises that make their 
own managerial and production decisions independent of the state.129  Thus, 
they are no longer recognizable as the glorified work units they were in the 
Maoist era.130 
SOEs are still distinct from POEs in certain vital respects.  First, as 
mentioned above, SOEs are run by SASAC, which operates directly under 
the State Council and possesses the legal rights and duties of a controlling 
shareholder under the Law on State-Owned Assets of Enterprises.131  While 
government officials have emphasized that SASAC should not meddle in the 
business operations of SOEs, it possesses an enormous amount of power over 
them under the State-Owned Assets law.132  The CCP is thus, for all intents 
and purposes, “the real decision maker when it comes to making senior 
personnel decisions in Chinese SOEs.”133   This is reinforced by formal 
 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1152–53. 
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 133. Du, supra note 9, at 1153. 
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government regulations that emphasize that the CCP possesses absolute 
control over SOE executives.134 
Although Chinese SOEs are now profit-driven enterprises that are listed 
on numerous foreign stock exchanges and function in many respects as 
normal corporations, the interests of the Chinese state are paramount in 
decision-making processes.135  Even advocates for more favorable treatment 
of Chinese SOEs abroad admit that their executives are judged first and 
foremost on their ability to comply with and carry out government orders and 
objectives.136  SOE executives who produce profits but fail to comply with 
the demands of the state will likely find themselves jobless.137  The CEO of 
every major Chinese SOE has a red phone in their office that solely remits 
calls from the CCP.138  Moreover, in instances where the interests of the 
company conflict with those of the state, the state generally wins out.139  
Research indicates that financial performance is far less of a factor in the 
turnover of executives within Chinese SOEs than in other corporations and 
that political promotion is a greater motivating factor for SOE executives 
than financial gains.140  There is thus a real possibility that Chinese SOEs 
operating abroad will face direct pressure from the state to carry out overseas 
operations in a manner that benefits Chinese state interests—and harms those 
of other states, especially powerful rivals like the United States. 
B.  Surge in Chinese Investment:  China’s Capacity 
to Pump Funds into the U.S. Economy 
CFIUS’s modus operandi has been balancing real national security 
concerns posed by foreign investment with the potential benefits of the same 
since its establishment in the 1970s.  Indeed, at every stage of its existence, 
the Committee has faced pressure from Congress for its perceived failure to 
emphasize national security over the positive economic effects of increased 
inbound investment.141  This tension—and the repercussions of Congress’s 
hostile stance toward foreign investors—was explained succinctly by Clyde 
V. Prestowitz, a trade official during the Regan administration.142  When 
interviewed during the battle over the DP World deal, Prestowitz said:  “We 
need a net inflow of capital of $3 billion a day to keep the economy 
afloat . . . [y]et all of the body language here is ‘go away.’”143  While China 
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poses security threats that are in many ways more severe than those seen in 
the past, its rapid accumulation of wealth and the increasing desire of its 
corporations to spend that wealth abroad pose a significant opportunity to 
boost U.S. economic growth.144 
As China’s economy has grown over the past few decades, its 
companies—both SOEs and POEs—have sought to expand abroad.145  This 
trend has skyrocketed since 2005, with Chinese outbound foreign direct 
investment (FDI) growing on average by 40 percent each year.146  In 2015 
alone, Chinese firms invested $121 billion overseas, making the country one 
of the top five exporters of investment in the world.147  The Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) has stated that 2016 is on track to be a record-
breaking year as outbound flows are up 54 percent from 2015 in the first three 
quarters of the year.148  This trend is likely to continue to pick up pace in the 
future, even if the Chinese economy’s current travails snowball into a 
recession.  Indeed, many speculate that growing Chinese investment in 
Western nations is spurred by uncertainty among the Chinese business class 
with respect to the country’s political and economic outlook.149 
China’s outbound investment was not initially directed at the United States 
but at other developing nations.150  This changed rapidly after the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008, as the Chinese government liberalized its outbound FDI 
policy, the domestic Chinese market grew increasingly saturated and more 
expensive, and the drop in valuation of American assets in the wake of the 
recession created a perfect storm to drive Chinese corporations into the 
West.151 
Though Chinese and U.S. government data conflict on the scale of Chinese 
investment in the United States, both reveal that it has grown rapidly over the 
past decade. 152   The Rhodium Group, which tracks Sino-U.S. direct 
investment in both directions, notes that Chinese investment in the United 
States grew from a combined value of less than $1 billion per year between 
2005 to 2009 to a whopping $7 billion in 2012.153  That number doubled to 
$14 billion in 2013, thanks in part to the Shuanghui-Smithfield merger.154  
Though the Shuanghui merger’s size would indicate that 2013’s record would 
not be surpassed anytime soon, investment barely dipped to $12.8 billion in 
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2014 and then set a new record of $15.3 billion in 2015.155  2016 is set to be 
another record-breaking year, as the value of Chinese FDI transactions 
exceeded that of the total set in 2015 within the first half of the year.156  With 
$18 billion in inbound investment recorded in the first half of the year and 
$33 billion in announced but uncompleted deals as of June 2016, Chinese 
investment in the United States is now one hundred times the level of what it 
was a decade ago.157 
The U.S. government’s data is somewhat incomplete regarding the specific 
industries in which the Chinese investment boom has occurred because up to 
38 percent of China-related transactions have not disclosed the relevant 
industry out of concerns for shareholders’ confidentiality.158  MOFCOM has 
released fuller data regarding outbound investment by Chinese corporations.  
As of 2014, it found that 39 percent of Chinese investment in the United 
States was in the finance sector, 17 percent in manufacturing, 12 percent in 
mining, 8 percent in real estate, 7 percent in wholesale and retail trade, 5 
percent in the energy supply and production industry, 4 percent in leasing and 
business services, and 8 percent in other spheres. 159   Data collected by 
KPMG further indicates that acquisitions of U.S. corporations by their 
Chinese counterparts are increasingly undertaken by POEs rather than 
SOEs.160  The number of SOE-related deals declined from 120 in 2010 to 
117 in 2015, while the number of POE-related deals exploded from 147 to 
381 in the same period.161 
One notable aspect of Chinese investment in the United States is the 
manner in which it has occurred, with merger and acquisition deals 
consistently accounting for much of the high-profile China-related 
transactions.162  This, coupled with misgivings over the motivation for the 
increase in Chinese investment, has helped fuel suspicions that Chinese 
investment is tied to a desire to plunder U.S. intellectual property or 
undermine U.S. economic leadership.163  Another issue increasingly facing 
Chinese investors overseas, beyond the national security issues discussed 
here, is the lack of reciprocity from the Chinese government, which is 
unwilling to open up its markets to further foreign competition as the 
economy slows.164 
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The U.S. government has promised its Chinese counterpart that inbound 
investors from Chinese corporations are welcome and that the United States 
“commits to maintain [an] open investment environment for various kinds of 
Chinese investors.”165  Part and parcel of this guarantee was the promise that 
CFIUS would not treat Chinese investors any differently than any other 
parties seeking to do business in the United States.166  This has arguably not 
been true over the last decade as Chinese investment has exploded in the 
United States, since Congress and CFIUS have responded by applying 
intense pressure on Chinese investors.167  The next part explores the reaction 
of CFIUS and Congress to the rapid growth of Chinese investment in the 
United States. 
III.  THE UNITED STATES’S RESPONSE 
TO THE ISSUES POSED BY CHINA’S STATE CAPITALISM:  
SIGNIFICANT ADJUDICATIONS 
While Chinese corporations have become the main target of CFIUS review 
over the last few years,168 they have long triggered concern because of their 
tight relationship with the state and the generally tense nature of Sino-U.S. 
relations.  The first transaction to fall victim to the Exon-Florio-empowered 
CFIUS in 1990 involved an attempted takeover of a Seattle-based 
manufacturing company, MAMCO Inc., by a Chinese SOE, the China 
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC).169  The 
only other transactions to be terminated by the President after a CFIUS 
investigation also involved Chinese corporations—Ralls in 2012 and Fujian 
Grand Chip in 2016.170  The rise of China’s economy and rapid increase in 
investment in the United States by Chinese corporations has spurred calls by 
Congress for stricter oversight of inbound foreign investment. 
As Chinese corporations have increasingly shifted their attention to 
overseas markets, apprehension regarding the relationship that those 
corporations have with the Chinese state have become a major stumbling 
block for their attempts to go global.171  SOEs are an obvious source of 
suspicion given their openly subordinate relationship with the Chinese 
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state,172 but many Western governments, including the U.S. government, are 
also hesitant to allow heavy investment by Chinese POEs given the opaque 
nature of these companies’ ties to the PRC.173  Unsurprisingly, China is now 
the primary source of covered transactions for CFIUS review, and has been 
for three years in a row.174 
This part explores the approach taken by CFIUS and Congress to the issues 
that China’s state-capitalism poses when considering potential investment by 
Chinese corporations in various industries, in addition to Congress’s attempt 
to force CFIUS’s hand in taking a tougher stance on Chinese corporations.  
Part III.A examines CFIUS & Congress’s approach to the acquisition by a 
Chinese company of U.S. counterparts in the telecommunications industry, 
then Part III.B examines the same with respect to the acquisiton of wind 
farms, and Part III.C revisits the Shuanghui case. 
A.  No Way, Huawei:  CFIUS and Congress 
Take a Stand Against Chinese Investment 
in the Telecommunications Industry 
Soon after the passage of FINSA, Chinese corporations began to make 
serious efforts to expand into the United States, either by investing heavily 
in certain industries or attempting to acquire American corporations 
outright.175  This trend was met with immediate suspicion by many, fearing 
that the true motivations behind these investment and acquisition schemes by 
Chinese corporations in the United States were political rather than 
economic.176   Huawei, a telecommunications giant and one of the most 
successful Chinese POEs,177 came under immediate and intense scrutiny 
when its U.S. subsidiary, Futurewei, purchased various assets from 3Leaf, an 
insolvent technology start-up in California.178 
Huawei had already been operating in the United States for a decade when 
it made its bid to purchase 3Leaf in May 2010.179  The company had been 
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subject to a number of accusations and suspicions in the lead up to the 3Leaf 
purchase, including claims of “‘close connections with the Chinese military,’ 
‘disputes over intellectual property rights,’ ‘allegations of financial support 
from the Chinese government,’ and ‘threats to the national security of the 
United States.’” 180   While the Bureau of Industry and Security at the 
Department of Commerce initially permitted Huawei to purchase and export 
3Leaf’s technology, CFIUS immediately decided to intervene in the 
transaction and launched an investigation into its potential national security 
ramifications.181 
Huawei complied with CFIUS’s investigation and submitted a number of 
filings to dispel concerns about its acquisition of 3Leaf in November 2010.182  
CFIUS, however, was not convinced, and on February 11, 2011, formally 
recommended that Huawei drop its attempted acquisition of 3Leaf.183  In 
response to CFIUS’s unfavorable recommendation and the negative press 
that it engendered for the company, Huawei’s chairman, Ken Hu, penned an 
open letter refuting a number of the accusations that had been levied against 
his company.184  Hu concluded the op-ed by stating that he “sincerely hope[s] 
that the United States government will address this issue by carrying out a 
formal investigation of any doubts it may have about Huawei in an effort to 
reach a clear and accurate conclusion.”185 
Congress immediately took Huawei up on its offer and launched an 
investigation into the accusations levied against the company. 186   In a 
blistering report that blasted Huawei for its lack of transparency and 
consistent refusal to disclose information about its internal governance 
structure,187 Congress noted that its preliminary review 
highlighted the potential security threat posed by Chinese 
telecommunications companies with potential ties to the Chinese 
government or military.  In particular, to the extent these companies are 
influenced by the state, or provide Chinese intelligence services access to 
telecommunication networks, the opportunity exists for further economic 
and foreign espionage by a foreign nation-state already known to be a major 
perpetrator of cyber espionage.188 
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Based on that conclusion, Congress made a number of recommendations, 
including (1) that the U.S. government “view with suspicion” the attempted 
penetration of its telecommunications market by Chinese companies, and that 
CFIUS specifically block any and all acquisitions, mergers, and takeovers 
involving Huawei because it poses a threat to national security;189 (2) that 
private sector firms also maintain vigilance when making use of Huawei’s 
equipment or services given it “cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state 
influence”; 190  (3) that relevant Congressional committees and executive 
enforcement agencies investigate the unfair trade practices 
utilized by Chinese telecommunications firms;191 (4) that Chinese companies 
generally become more transparent; 192  and (5) that relevant committees 
within Congress consider potential legislation to address the security risks 
posed by telecommunications firms with strong ties to nation-states.193 
Congress’s affirmation of CFIUS’s order reflects its general tendency to 
be more hardline in its approach to screening investment.194  Moreover, its 
insistence on looking beyond Huawei’s corporate ownership to the function 
of each corporation’s party committee and the party ties of its management 
evinces a nuanced take on what constitutes “foreign control” under the Exon-
Florio Amendment and a willingness to carefully evaluate the eccentricities 
of Chinese corporations in light of Chinese state-capitalism.195 
B.  Blowing in the Wind:  Ralls and the First Successful Challenge 
to an Unfavorable CFIUS Review 
Huawei was not the only corporation with ties to China that came under 
fire from CFIUS in 2012.  Ralls Corp., a company incorporated in Delaware 
with its principle place of business in Georgia, found itself in the 
Committee’s crosshairs when it attempted to purchase four U.S. LLCs that 
were in the process of building wind farms in Oregon.196  While Ralls itself 
was theoretically an American company and thus outside of CFIUS’s 
purview, it was owned by two Chinese nationals, Dawei Duan and Jialiang 
Wu.197  Duan and Wu were the CFO and vice president, respectively, of Sany 
Electric Company, Ltd., a Chinese POE,198 and they set up Ralls to explore 
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“U.S. opportunities for the construction of windfarms in which the wind 
turbines of Sany Electric . . . can be used.”199 
Ralls’s acquisition of the four windfarm companies theoretically touched 
upon national security concerns because it intended to construct windfarms 
in the Butter Creek region of Oregon.200  The Butter Creek projects were 
located to the east of a restricted airspace and bombing zone maintained by 
the U.S. Navy; three of the wind farm sites were located within seven miles 
of the restricted airspace, while the fourth, the Lower Ridge Windfarm, was 
located within it.201  Ralls relocated the Lower Ridge Windfarm at the Navy’s 
request, but it still remained within the restricted airspace.202 
On June 28, 2012, Ralls submitted notice to CFIUS of its acquisition of 
the four LLCs and its plan to carry out the windfarm projects.203  In its notice, 
Ralls argued that the project did not pose a threat to national security, and it 
later answered a number of questions posed to it by CFIUS during the initial 
thirty-day-review period.204  However, Ralls contended that CFIUS at no 
point revealed why it was concerned with the project.205 
CFIUS ultimately found that Ralls’s acquisition of the windfarm LLCs 
posed a threat to national security and issued an “Order Establishing Interim 
Mitigation Measures” on July 25, which called on Ralls to halt construction 
on the windfarms within five days. 206   An additional order in August 
prohibited Ralls from divesting itself of the four corporations until all of its 
assets were removed from the Butter Creek site.207 
Finally, on September 28, President Obama issued an order terminating 
the transaction on the grounds that there was “credible evidence that leads 
[the President] to believe that Ralls . . . might take action that threatens to 
impair the national security of the United States.”208  The order forced Ralls 
to divest its interest in the four companies within ninety days, remove all 
items and construction from the four sites, refrain from entering any of the 
sites, refrain from selling any parts for use in the sites, and refrain from 
selling the four companies to any third party.209 
CFIUS at no point gave Ralls any indication of why it was suspicious of 
the company and its windfarm project nor did it reveal the evidence on which 
it based its final decision.210  This allowed the company to make a unique 
legal challenge to the order, arguing that CFIUS and the President denied 
Ralls due process and acted outside of the scope of their authority.211  Section 
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721 of the Defense Production Act, which delineates CFIUS’s powers 
pursuant to the Exon-Florio Amendment, provides that the President’s 
actions in the aftermath of CFIUS review are not subject to judicial review, 
which typically means presidential orders are final.212  However, because 
Ralls brought a constitutional claim, the court examined congressional intent 
regarding the justiciability of such claims and found that they did not fall 
under the provision exempting CFIUS and the President from judicial 
review.213 
Ralls ultimately prevailed, as the court held that the presidential order 
deprived the company of its property interests without due process. 214  
CFIUS was required to provide Ralls with the unclassified evidence it used 
in determining that the company’s windfarm projects constituted a national 
security threat.215  While the court’s due process finding is beyond the scope 
of this Note, it provides an interesting check on CFIUS’s power, which has 
only grown since its establishment in 1975.  More to the point, the case 
exemplifies how suspicions over Chinese involvement in investment and 
acquisition schemes can sometimes engender harsh outcomes, given the 
strained connection of the windfarms to national security, CFIUS’s refusal to 
explain its decision, and the fact that other foreign-made or foreign-owned 
windfarms that were in the same area encountered no issues.216 
C.  Show Me the Bacon:  Congress’s Opposition 
to the Shuanghui-Smithfield Deal Calls into Question 
the Scope of National Security Concerns 
Congress noted in its report on Huawei that a major aspect of its concerns 
was that Chinese corporations were increasingly becoming major players in 
the global telecommunications industry, a field which inherently touches 
upon national security issues.217  It further indicated that the issues broached 
in the report did not relate to Chinese corporations generally but 
telecommunications firms in particular, noting that “[i]n 
another industry, this development might not be particularly concerning.”218  
Congress seemingly backtracked that stance within a few months when 
Chinese pork supplier Shuanghui attempted to buy out its U.S. competitor 
Smithfield in what promised to be the largest acquisition of an American 
company by a Chinese counterpart in history.219 
Shuanghui is a Hong Kong-based POE whose pork supplying business 
came to dominate the mainland market during the Reform Era.220  Pork 
consumption accounts for over 60 percent of total meat consumption in the 
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PRC,221 and the country’s rapidly expanding middle class has made it a 
valuable market for foreign pork producers seeking to export their product.222  
This made the merger between U.S. firm Smithfields, the largest hog raiser 
and pork producer in the world,223 and Shuanghui, China’s biggest pork 
supplier, 224  a desirable move for both corporations:  it gave Smithfield 
unfettered access to the Chinese market and Shuanghui the largest supply of 
quality pork in the world.225 
Shuanghui’s bid to acquire Smithfield, which it eventually did for $7.1 
billion,226 was also the largest instance of foreign investment by a Chinese 
corporation in the United States.227  Unsurprisingly, there was significant 
opposition to the deal in Congress in the wake of the Huawei investigation 
and the Ralls controversy.228  Two main points of contention were raised 
regarding Shuanghui’s bid to buyout Smithfield.  The first point, that China’s 
food safety and quality controls were subpar and thus a threat to U.S. food 
security, tied opposition to the merger to national security concerns.229 
The second issue raised by Congress was the seeming irrationality of the 
move given that Shuanghui was actually half Smithfield’s size and Smithfield 
was doing well financially on its own.230  Inherent in this line of questioning 
were generalized suspicions of the motives behind Chinese corporations with 
ties to the state acquiring U.S. counterparts, as questions were again raised 
regarding the links between Shuanghui and the Chinese state.231  In a hearing 
held in July 2013, the Senate Agriculture Committee expressed concerns that 
the acquisition was a covert attempt by China to control the price of pork and 
gain access to U.S. intellectual property.232  Senators Debbie Stabenow of 
Michigan and Mike Johanns of Nebraska further noted that a U.S. 
corporation would be barred from this kind of investment in China, raising 
concerns about reciprocity.233 
In a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Senate Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry urged CFIUS to review the merger, 
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name the Department of Agriculture as a lead agency in the review,234 and 
expand the scope of national security review by considering the “broader 
issues of food security, food safety, and biosecurity.”235  The letter argued 
that “our food supply is critical infrastructure that should be included in any 
reasonable person’s definition of national security.”236 
CFIUS launched the statutorily required forty-five-day investigation of the 
proposed merger in a nod to Congress’s concerns regarding the potential 
impact of the deal on food safety.237  However, the Committee ignored 
Congress’s calls to include the Department of Agriculture in the investigation 
and consider food security as “critical infrastructure” and thus a component 
of national security.238  Unsurprisingly, this led to fairly quick approval of 
the merger, which Shuanghui and Smithfield announced in September 
2013.239 
IV.  EXPLORING REFORM:  CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS 
AND BALANCING THREATS WITH OPPORTUNITIES 
The inflow of Chinese investment in the United States, coupled with 
general anxiety over what China’s rise means for the future of U.S. power in 
the world, has led to attempts to reform CFIUS over the past few years.  In 
many ways, this push has mirrored past efforts which culminated in CFIUS 
reform, from the anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1980s that led to the Exon-
Florio Amendment to the post-9/11 apprehension of the Middle East that led 
to FINSA.240  While China’s political system, tense relationship with the 
United States, and the opaque governance structure of its companies warrant 
concern, many of the proposals put forth both by Congress and outside 
groups constitute an overreach that would stymie much needed investment 
from flowing into the country. 
Part IV.A discusses current proposals to reform CFIUS, and Part IV.B 
critiques these efforts and makes the case for an executive order that would 
mandate strict CFIUS review for acquisitions and investments in industries 
that raise national security concerns. 
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A.  Current Congressional Efforts to Reform CFIUS 
Congress was not pleased by CFIUS’s approval of the Shuanghui merger 
and its seeming refusal to consider food safety a component of national 
security.241  Senator Stabenow immediately released a statement, noting: 
It remains unclear what factors the committee took into account in making 
its decision.  We still do not know if the potential impact on American food 
security, the transfer of taxpayer-funded innovation to a foreign competitor, 
or China’s protectionist trade barriers were considered.  It’s troubling that 
taxpayers have received no assurances that these critical issues have been 
taken into account in transferring control of one of America’s largest food 
producers to a Chinese competitor with a spotty record on food safety.242 
Senator Stabenow later announced she was drafting legislation to 
“overhaul the American government’s review process for foreign 
acquisitions”243  to ensure that it takes into account “the impact that the 
purchase could have on a broad array of national priorities and interests.”244  
Senator Stabenow’s statements imply a drive to push CFIUS to evaluate the 
“economic and cultural ramifications”245 of proposed foreign investment 
rather than the national security approach the Committee currently takes, a 
stark change seemingly fueled by fears of Chinese investment. 
While Senator Stabenow’s attempts to reform CFIUS have yet to 
materialize, other members of Congress have proposed two pieces of 
legislation in the same vein.246  Congresswoman Rosa Delauro proposed the 
Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act of 2014 (FIESA) in 
September 2014, a bill that, if passed, would substantially broaden the scope 
of CFIUS review. 247   Congresswoman Delauro’s legislation is aimed at 
expanding CFIUS review “beyond national security to include an analysis of 
transactions for a ‘net benefit’ to U.S. interests, and for ‘other purposes.’”248  
The bill would thus drastically reform CFIUS’s function insofar as it would 
essentially be carrying out an economic effects analysis on every covered 
transaction—which would now entail nearly every proposed foreign 
investment transaction as review would not be limited to industries related to 
national security.249  The bill also directly addresses concerns regarding 
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Chinese corporations and their ties to the state by mandating that the 
Committee consider the “governance and commercial orientation of the 
foreign [party]” 250  and the extent to which it is “owned, controlled or 
influenced by a foreign government.”251  Christopher Brewster and Mary 
Ellen Stanley note that the bill did not have a realistic chance of enactment 
given its introduction late in the term and its controversial scope; its intent 
was rather to “revive debate over the scope of CFIUS review, including 
whether, when and how to expand review to factors other than national 
security.”252 
Although Delauro’s and Stabenow’s legislation appear to have joined the 
ranks of other failed attempts to strengthen CFIUS, Senator Grassley of Iowa 
introduced the Securing American Food Equity (SAFE) Act of 2016.253  In a 
nod to Congress’s demands during the Shuanghui review, the bill would 
introduce the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS as a permanent member and 
add agricultural assets as a critical infrastructure to be analyzed by CFIUS.254  
Senator Grassley noted: 
We’re seeing more and more foreign investment in our agriculture assets, 
and it’s something we need to be very aware of.  The transactions that are 
occurring today will shape the food industry for decades to come.  We need 
to be thinking strategically about who will control our food supply 
tomorrow . . . .  Food security is national security.255 
The SAFE Act, coming in the wake of the attempted acquisition of 
Syngenta AG, a Swiss pesticide and seed company, by China National 
Chemical Corporation (“ChemChina”), 256  marks the second attempt by 
Congress to expand CFIUS’s scope to include economic and agricultural 
considerations in the wake of a China-related merger and acquisition deal.257 
While it is too early to tell whether the SAFE Act will come to fruition, 
concerns about food security, Chinese investment, and Chinese investment 
in the food industry in particular have gained ground on both sides of the 
aisle.258  The bill also could potentially lead to calls to add the Secretary of 
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Labor to CFIUS, further complicating the picture for Chinese would-be 
investors.259 
Congress also seems increasingly determined to take measures aimed 
directly at Chinese companies.  In November 2016, the U.S.-China Economic 
Security Review Commission, a body established by Congress in 2000 to 
review the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic 
relationship between the United States and the PRC,260 released its annual 
report on Sino-U.S. relations.261  One of its recommendations was a complete 
ban on investment in the United States by Chinese SOEs.262  The heavy 
measure was perhaps unsurprising given the Commission has traditionally 
been very critical of China generally and the executive branch’s perceived 
lenience in dealing with the country.263   However, the recommendation 
reflects increasing concern in Congress regarding the exponential increase in 
Chinese investment in the United States and concerns that the trend is a 
function of “state-directed campaigns to acquire U.S. assets that have 
economic or military significance.”264 
After Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election—and his 
almost immediate moves to rile China265—some commentators posited that 
the United States could use CFIUS as a tool against the PRC should trade 
tensions heat up.266  David Dollar of the Brookings Institute argued that the 
only responsible way to combat China on trade was to use CFIUS review to 
pressure the Chinese government into opening up its economy to 
investment.267 
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B.  Proposed Resolution:  Addressing Valid Concerns 
Without Driving Away Chinese Investors 
Widespread apprehension over Chinese investment is not unfounded; not 
only are Chinese corporations intimately tied to the state regardless of their 
governance structure,268 China is at best a rival to the United States and the 
interests of the two nations are often in conflict.  Tensions in the South China 
Sea,269 frequent hacking from military-aligned parties within China,270 and 
recent news that U.S. consumers’ androids relay data back to an unknown 
source in China271 all show that screening of inbound investment from China 
is necessary.  However, it is vital that the U.S. response be measured, as a 
politically motivated overreaction to the potential threat posed promises to 
dash the potential opportunities for burgeoning investment in the U.S. 
economy. 
1.  Considering Current Proposals 
With that in mind, the current proposals for CFIUS reform are well 
intentioned but ill informed and are bogged down by political calculations 
that ultimately do more harm than good.  Senator Stabenow’s insistence on 
bringing the Secretary of Agriculture into the Committee and expanding the 
scope of its review, given fresh life by the SAFE Act, needlessly complicates 
CFIUS review by adding an economic factor into its analysis when the 
Committee should be focused on national security concerns.272  Given that 
the campaign against Shuanghui and the subsequent attempts to bring food 
production into the scope of CFIUS has been led by Senators from the 
Midwest, it would appear that the impetus behind this push for reform is not 
entirely related to actual national security concerns.  It is vital that any effort 
to reform the Committee be undertaken for the purpose of strengthening its 
ability to screen and control for national security concerns, not serve as a 
protectionist barrier to investment to score political points. 
This is not to imply that food security is a frivolous concern—it is certainly 
worthy of consideration, particularly given the poor state of quality control 
in the food services industry in China.  However, inclusion of the Secretary 
of Agriculture and food security issues would likely trigger more challenges 
for CFIUS reform, as other relatively tangential considerations would also 
have a reasonable case for inclusion in Committee discussions.273  The best 
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way to handle transactions that implicate food security is the current 
approach used by the Committee in reviewing the Shuanghui merger:  
screening such deals to ensure that the foreign party complies with all 
relevant U.S. food security regulations.274 
For similar reasons, Representative Delauro’s attempt to reshape CFIUS 
as a body primarily concerned with the economic effects of investment deals 
is shortsighted.275  Perhaps more importantly, it would not likely change the 
scope of what the Committee does to the extent that its congressional critics 
seem to believe it will.  CFIUS has been consistently less harsh on inbound 
foreign investment than Congress precisely because, as a Committee chaired 
by the Secretary of the Treasury, it places heavy consideration on 
the economic impact of potential investment and acquisition deals.276  A 
dramatic alteration in the scope of what CFIUS does as contemplated by 
Representative Delauro’s proposed legislation would thus have the effect of 
downplaying national security concerns when it is designed to do the exact 
opposite. 
The recommendations from the U.S.-China Economic Security Review 
Commission to put a blanket ban on Chinese SOEs directly addresses the real 
concern surrounding inbound Chinese investment—the connection it 
inevitably has with the Chinese state.  However, it too falls short.  While 
SOEs are more obviously inextricably linked to the Chinese government by 
virtue of being controlled by SASAC, 277  they are not necessarily more 
troublesome than Chinese POEs.  Indeed, the distinction between state and 
private ownership is of questionable utility with respect to Chinese 
corporations, 278  which makes the Commission’s recommendation fairly 
shallow; it would serve as a blanket ban on SOE investment in industries and 
companies where no national security threat is present, while POEs face no 
enhanced restrictions in spite of being similarly situated.  Given 84 percent 
of Chinese investment currently stems from POEs,279 the ban would fail to 
restrict potentially troublesome sources of Chinese investment while sending 
a fairly negative signal to would-be investors and China generally. 
Finally, the recommendation to use CFIUS as a tool in a potential trade 
war with China is feasible in the short term but entails far greater risks than 
the other suggested reforms.  CFIUS could certainly be used as a means to 
pressure China into allowing U.S. corporations to invest in the PRC as freely 
as Chinese companies are permitted to in the United States.  The current lack 
of reciprocity is a valid concern that has been raised frequently by members 
of Congress who have pushed for CFIUS reform, particularly Senator 
Stabenow.280  However, CFIUS is not meant to be a political tool in a trade 
war; it exists to safeguard the country from potential national security threats.  
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Abusing its function runs the risk of damaging the economy by rejecting 
beneficial investment.  It could easily prove counterproductive, pushing the 
Chinese government to take a harder stance on U.S. corporations rather than 
eliciting concessions.  Moreover, while China’s protectionist investment 
policies are a cause for concern, U.S. investment in China is still significantly 
larger than Chinese investment in the United States.281 
2.  Proposed Reform:  Mandating Review in Key Industries 
The current proposals to reform CFIUS may be misguided, but they are 
not unwarranted.  While the inflow of Chinese investment promises to pour 
money into the U.S. economy, and investment is generally a net positive, 
China is a unique country and thus poses unique challenges.  Any measures 
taken to reform CFIUS in the coming age of Chinese investment in the United 
States must take into account the potential threats posed by the link between 
Chinese corporations and the Chinese state without needlessly discouraging 
nonproblematic investment. 
This can be done not by expanding the scope of what CFIUS reviews or 
instituting blanket bans on Chinese SOEs but by mandating CFIUS 
investigations for industries that intimately relate to national security.  This 
must include the standard industries typically thought of in conjunction with 
national security concerns—manufacturing, technology, energy and natural 
resources, transportation, and, perhaps most critically in an age of ever-
increasing technological advances, telecommunications.  Though CFIUS 
currently has leeway in determining whether a longer, forty-five-day 
investigation is mandated upon reviewing a transaction, 282  the rise of 
Chinese investment coupled with increased cybersecurity threats means 
almost any investment in certain industries by a Chinese corporation will 
raise a red flag.  The investigation into Huawei provides a good example of 
how CFIUS should operate with respect to Chinese corporations seeking to 
invest in the telecommunications industry;283 its stringent analysis of the 
company’s governance structure and the ties its executives had to the Chinese 
government looked beyond the SOE/POE distinction and focused on the 
actual threat posed.284 
Congress, in its own investigation into the deals, took a similar stance and 
went on to stress that a major factor in the stringent review Huawei faced was 
the industry in which it operated.285  This was wise insofar as it sent a clear 
message that national security concerns would only imperil investment deals 
in the United States in areas that clearly implicate national security.  
Unfortunately, Congress—and at times, CFIUS itself, as seen with its 
handling of Ralls—has largely ignored this caveat in favor of a blanket 
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apprehension of Chinese investment ridden with political and protectionist 
undertones. 
Utilizing an industry-based method to screen investment would not be 
unprecedented.286  For much of the Cold War, the United States and sixteen 
other nations participated in the Coordinating Committee for  
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).287  COCOM utilized an industry-
based approach to restrict trade in sensitive goods with hostile powers.288  
Utilizing a strategy from the Cold War to screen Chinese investment may at 
first seem like a fairly aggressive move; indeed, China was a major target of 
COCOM after the Korean War.289  However, applying this industry-based 
approach uniformly to all nations is a far less combative—and more 
productive—method than blanket bans on Chinese investors. 
The benefit of focusing CFIUS review on certain industries, particularly 
communications, is that such reform will orient the Committee toward the 
threats of the future without singling out Chinese investors in particular.  
The unprecedented degree of hacking in the 2016 presidential election290 
illustrates how vulnerable the United States is to such threats but also 
illustrates that China is far from the only (or even the primary) source of 
telecommunications-related threats to national security and the integrity of 
the U.S. political system.291  Adopting an industry-based approach will thus 
address issues posed by the growth in Chinese investment and address more 
general security issues that are likely to arise in the future. 
Finally, in focusing CFIUS reform by mandating investigation in sensitive 
industries, the core concerns surrounding Chinese investment will be 
addressed without actively targeting Chinese investors.  This serves to reduce 
tensions and dispel the feeling among many in the Chinese business 
community that the United States is hostile to any investment by Chinese 
corporations, a reasonable assessment given the controversy surrounding the 
Shuanghui merger.  CFIUS can help the United States ride the tidal wave of 
Chinese investment, rather than drown in it, only if it takes a nuanced 
approach to review that separates real threats from illusory ones. 
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CONCLUSION 
While China is a strategic rival to the United States, it is also a vital trading 
partner.  The United States stands to benefit from the Chinese economy’s 
growth as its businesses look to invest abroad.  It is vital that CFIUS and the 
U.S. government address the legitimate security concerns raised by Chinese 
investments in the United States, while simultaneously maintaining an open 
door for investment that will lead to greater wealth for American businesses 
and job opportunities for workers.  CFIUS can do exactly that by strictly 
reviewing transactions in industries inherently tied to national security 
concerns, while maintaining its erstwhile welcoming approach to investment 
in other sectors.  An executive order along the lines contemplated in the 
following appendix that mandates CFIUS review in sensitive industries 
would be preferable to the various proposals currently being put forth for 
CFIUS reform. 
APPENDIX 
Executive Order of [Date] 
 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of 
the United States of America, including the Act of February 14, 1903, as 
amended (15 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934, as amended (31 U.S.C. 822a), and section 301 of title 3 of the United 
States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby 
ordered as follows: 
That the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States shall 
hereby be mandated to conduct full reviews and investigations in accordance 
with section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 with respect to 
covered transactions in the following industries: 
1. Telecommunications; 
2. Manufacturing; 
3. Technology; 
4. Energy and Natural Resources; and 
5. Transportation. 
 
Donald J. Trump 
The White House, 
[Date] 
 
